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Introduction
Ruth Buchanan, Stewart Motha, and  
Sundhya Pahuja
A book like this, a problem like this, is in no hurry; we both, I just as 
much as my book, are friends of lento. It is not for nothing that I have 
been a philologist, perhaps I am a philologist still, that is to say, a teacher 
of slow reading: – in the end I also write slowly. Nowadays it is not only my 
habit, it is also to my taste – a malicious taste, perhaps? – no longer to 
write anything which does not reduce to despair every sort of man who is 
‘in a hurry’. For philology is that venerable art which demands of its vota-
ries one thing above all: to go aside, to take time, to become still, to 
become slow – it is a goldsmith’s art and connoisseurship of the word 
which has nothing but delicate, cautious work to do and achieves nothing 
if it does not achieve it lento. But for precisely this reason it is more neces-
sary than ever today, by precisely this means does it entice and enchant us 
the most, in the midst of an age of ‘work’, that is to say, of hurry, of inde-
cent and perspiring haste, which wants to ‘get everything done’ at once, 
including every old or new book: – this art does not so easily get anything 
done, it teaches to read well, that is to say, to read slowly, deeply, looking 
cautiously before and aft, with reservations, with doors left open, with del-
icate eyes and fingers . . . My patient friends, this book desires for itself 
only perfect readers and philologists: learn to read me well!
(Nietzsche 1881/1982: 5)
Modern western formulations of legal scholarship have been formed – and 
continue to circulate – around the question of the authority of the law of 
the sovereign state and the practices of government. Such concerns are 
central to the formation and maintenance of the European state in its 
national, imperial, and international guises. This book takes up these con-
cerns, but ‘slantwise’,1 addressing itself to the question of how to live with 
the law of modernity through the question of reading and, specifically, 
how to read the modernity of law. The essays in this volume arise out of a 
symposium focussed on the work of Professor Peter Fitzpatrick.
 As late moderns, we inhabit a world that has been shaped by the 
demand for the security of both the sovereign territorial state and the 
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2  Reading Modern Law
power and wealth of empire. Questions of sovereignty and domination 
and of subordination and freedom have driven these claims of security 
and protection, but have driven, too, the claims of right and of justice. In 
turn, such questions and claims have engendered the critical scrutiny of 
the practices of politics, law, and morality. And even as we live in an age of 
neo-colonialism, the over-consumption of resources and the destruction 
of the environment, our responses remain shaped by the forms of law by 
which we live. The various chapters of this book attend to the ways that 
critics from within and across the common law tradition have approached 
what we might think of as ‘sovereign formations’ and the origins or 
grounds of law – and through this our ‘situation’ as subjects of law.
 The origins of law have long been a central concern of the ‘theoretical’ 
branch of the discipline. This book considers reading as central to develop-
ing a critical methodology capable of addressing that concern, and the 
persistence of, and limits to, a variety of sovereign formations. Reading 
modern law as we envisage it here is an attitude, posture, and style. In this 
book we advocate reading slowly, attentively, again and again,2 in order to 
attend to the vanishing point (or limits) of what appears substantial in 
law’s extravagant claims. Such claims include the notions that law is auto-
nomous, that it grounds itself, that it is ever responsive to the new, and 
that it carries universal values and aspirations. Here, we remind ourselves 
that the work of reading, like that of listening, is as much the work of the 
critic as is responding to injustice. Such reading, slow reading, also serves 
to join and re-join with the possibilities and potential law.
 The strategies of reading and the styles of writing and argumentation 
explored in these essays draw inspiration from the work of Peter Fitz-
patrick. Fitzpatrick’s work spans 30 years of patient reading of the origins 
and (authoritative) grounds of modern law. It is a body of work that might 
retroactively pass under the heading of the decolonization of law, and 
offers a style or ethos of slow reading which tries to do justice to law, and 
to a life lived with law. Fitzpatrick’s readings of law’s grounds are thus both 
a challenge to law and a form of care or love for law.
 In this book we take Fitzpatrick’s complex formulation of the dynamic 
conduct of law in terms of ‘determination and responsiveness’ as a device 
for reading slowly – for undoing, resisting, and reformulating a variety of 
sovereign formations. In Fitzpatrick’s hands the endless relation between 
determinacy and responsiveness gives us a point of ordering of the rela-
tions of law. His work offers us at least two ways of reading (modern law) 
slowly. First is the patient work of the redescription of western legal rela-
tions as a tradition forever engaged in the task of shoring up and breach-
ing its own boundaries. In its psychic and material states, the 
determination of law creates grounds, establishes territory, governs popu-
lations, and seeks security. At the same time, law must also be open to 
change and be able to respond to the realities of the world it engages. So, 
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Introduction  3
second, Fitzpatrick’s work calls on us, as critics, to read slowly to recast this 
dynamic, both to make visible its injustices and also to find new forms of 
responsiveness. The slow readings in this book also elaborate the patterns 
and styles created by such readings – their rhythm or tempo; the practices 
of re-inscription within and around the traditions of legal thought; the 
tracing of law as it moves; and an ethic of care that would ensure that law 
is not without response, or the possibility of justice.
 The chapters thus open appropriately enough with the question of 
justice, and specifically reading justice and the archive. Marianne Con-
stable in Chapter 1 observes that Fitzpatrick’s ‘insistent and persistent’ 
citations of the writings of others ‘incite us to (consider) what might other-
wise remain outside of writings of and about law: possibilities of justice’. 
Constable is concerned with the question of authorship, and specifically 
Fitzpatrick’s authorial style, as a key dimension of his practice of reading. 
The tension between an avowed willingness to be attentive to (or deter-
mined by) the specificity of the text, and the willingness to be open to that 
which those texts cannot contain, is an integral aspect of Fitzpatrick’s 
work. His layered, difficult philological writing invites us to engage in the 
project of reading modern law differently. Fitzpatrick’s work ‘challenges 
not only the imperialism of the state and its law, but also the imperialism 
of a particular sort of scholarship about law – in particular, that of the 
empirical social sciences’, as Constable puts it. Constable’s chapter eluci-
dates both challenges.
 Linking Fitzpatrick’s mode of reading to his approach to the question 
of sovereign formations, Constable begins by tracing the arc of Fitz-
patrick’s arguments about the United States’ sovereign assertion and its 
arrogation to itself a style of settled determinacy that transforms the nation 
from one which was once (reflexively) identified with the ‘revolutionary 
dimension of the rule of law’ to a ‘carrier of imperialism’. In contrast with 
the usual (critical) formulation, international law becomes the locus of a 
potential challenge to imperialism through an ‘imperative and counter-
imperial ethics’ which is encompassed (though not contained) within it. 
Constable notes that, for Fitzpatrick, international law is ‘both dissipated 
and state-centred’. The second, methodologically oriented challenge is 
developed by setting Fitzpatrick’s view of the role of custom in interna-
tional law alongside Sally Merry’s account of the role of culture in the 
translation of international human rights norms to local contexts. For 
Merry and Fitzpatrick, culture and custom respectively are both ‘fluid’ and 
‘promiscuous’, and in this respect are transgressive of legal norms. Yet for 
Fitzpatrick these transgressions have a constitutive dimension; indeed, it is 
precisely ‘the effects of active opposition, disregard and violations’ that 
‘merge to challenge law to become just’.
 For Constable, Fitzpatrick’s profound attention to texts is unapologeti-
cally symptomatic of ‘archive fever’. This attentiveness is held in constant 
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4  Reading Modern Law
tension with his equally unapologetic responsiveness to that which always 
exceeds the capacity of those texts, and that archive. Made visible in this 
tension are ‘unsettled silences and possibilities of response’ within which 
Constable locates the impossible fecundity of Fitzpatrick’s work. We are 
cautioned to be ‘wary of global visions and sovereign systems, both as 
claims and as facts’, yet the very failures of those visions and systems in 
relation to the ‘insatiable’ demands of justice are revealed as leaving 
spaces open for something else.
 Worrying and revisiting what is ‘settled’, whether territorially or in text, 
is the subject of Chapter 2, by James Martel. Martel offers us a double 
account of reading, presenting some uncanny parallels between the 
reading styles of Peter Fitzpatrick and Thomas Hobbes. Both Fitzpatrick 
and Hobbes (and, by implication, Martel) offer us ways of thinking about 
power and authority anew through reading. Both Fitzpatrick and Hobbes 
are concerned with the theological remnants in putatively secular forma-
tions. In Fitzpatrick’s case these remnants are made visible through prac-
tices of attentive reading. In Hobbes’ case the revelation is connected to 
his rhetorical sensibility, which manifests a certain ‘urge to truth’. As 
Martel points out, this urge becomes clear in Hobbes’ own comments on 
reading texts:
[I]t is not the bare Words, but the Scope of the writer that giveth the 
true light, by which any writing is to bee interpreted; and they that 
insist upon single Texts, without considering the main Designe, can 
derive no thing from them cleerly; but rather by casting atomes of 
Scripture, as dust before mens eyes, make every thing more obscure 
than it is; an ordinary artifice of those that seek not the truth, but 
their own advantage.
(Hobbes 1651/1996: 415)
Martel shows that Hobbes wants us to be attentive to the scope and design 
of a text, and ‘how we are to interpret and interact with (or read) the text 
overall’. The point is quilted when Martel guides us to read Fitzpatrick as a 
reader of Hobbes. Through his careful re-reading of Hobbes, and his 
refusal of received wisdom, Fitzpatrick seeks – and finds – a certain kind of 
lawfulness where others find only savagery and darkness. This reading, and 
rereading, enables Fitzpatrick, Martel argues, to find a ‘tender’ side to 
Leviathan, one that displaces the usual characterization of Hobbes as an 
authoritarian positivist, enabling the emergence of a different genealogy 
of liberal law and politics and engendering a call to a different kind of 
responsibility.
 From author and authority we turn our gaze to sovereignty, yet still 
‘slantwise’, not directly. The chapters by George Pavlich (Chapter 3) and 
Paul Passavant (Chapter 4) both share the sense that neither law nor its 
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Introduction  5
subjects can live without the ‘enchantment’ of the stories that sustain law 
as sovereignty and self-knowledge, judgement, and understanding. And 
each of them takes up the problem of how we are to read the variety of 
sovereign determinations through which power and authority are consti-
tuted and sustained, through which biopolitical life is administered and 
how critical beings resist, refuse, and rebel.
 A sovereign determination, Pavlich argues with Fitzpatrick, is at once 
decisive and responsive to that which is beyond the determination. This is 
as consistent with the ungrounded ground of medieval sovereignty as it is 
with a biopolitical power that posits itself through law. Drawing on Fitz-
patrick’s account of ‘the law of the law’, Pavlich offers a way to read both 
law and sovereignty which reveals their mutuality: the law in a given 
instance posits itself, and in that process an associated sovereignty 
emerges. But the law of sovereignty is then forever caught, produced, and 
read between determination and responsiveness.
 Like Martel, Pavlich insists on the radical potential of reading carefully, 
using Fitzpatrick as an exemplar of such practices of ‘radical reading’. 
Hobbes, for example, is sometimes thought to offer a form of law and pol-
itics delimited by territory, and a form of sovereign power that is illimita-
ble and ungovernable. For Pavlich, though, a different register of 
questioning sovereign power is in order: ‘Can the political logic (theo-
logy?) of an ungovernable sovereign be understood as an historical event? 
And have new “governmentalized” forms of sovereignty transformed this 
logic? If so, what might the laws of such governmental sovereignty be?’ 
Drawing on Foucault, Butler, and Fitzpatrick, Pavlich argues that sover-
eignty produces ungovernability as a mode of governance, and point of 
reading. We have seen the emergence of a ‘governmentalized sovereign’, 
a sovereign who ‘becomes’ through governing. These questions, which 
emerge through a careful re-reading of sovereign formations, enable us to 
‘refus[e] the ungovernable sovereign as definitive of all sovereignties’. 
Such refusal opens up the ‘unconditional’ aspect of sovereignty, drawing 
on Fitzpatrick again, to signal the unknown senses of a ‘governable’, or at 
least ‘governed’, sovereign, and open them to the possibility of other 
promises, including democracy.
 Paul Passavant’s chapter too picks up on these themes, avowedly locat-
ing his consideration of the relation between sovereignty and democracy 
from within ‘democracy’s ruins’ – the United States after the torture 
memos. Passavant too counterposes Fitzpatrick to Agamben’s work on 
sovereign power. In contrast with Agamben’s anti-juridical, messianic 
view of the transition from an ‘absolute sovereignty’ to the ‘coming com-
munity’, Fitzpatrick, in Passavant’s reading, mediates the relation 
between sovereignty and democracy within his conception of sovereignty 
itself. Modern sovereignty must ‘ “marvellously combine” being enclosed, 
one, corporate, and determining with also . . . being illimitable, plural, 
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6  Reading Modern Law
responsive, determinate, and dissipating’. And it must ‘combine these 
contradictory dimensions without recourse to a transcendental refer-
ence’. For Fitzpatrick, and for Passavant, this impossibly paradoxical 
combining is accomplished by the peculiar alchemy of modern law. Law, 
for Passavant, ‘is where we take a position on democracy’. Returning us 
to the ethical possibilities of (re-)reading the archive, Passavant’s chapter 
compellingly argues for the reclamation of law as ‘democracy’s archive’ 
– the site within which we may ‘recall principles of democracy and justice 
to ourselves, and send, again, this legacy to the future’.
 Taken as a practice of reading and writing which both challenges law 
and evinces a form of care or love for law – a fecund law, pregnant with 
possibility – Fitzpatrick’s work reminds us again and again that ‘the 
medium is the message’, or that the medium is there to be read. Yet as we 
see in Chapter 5, by Fleur Johns, and Chapter 10, by Carrol Clarkson, the 
message resonates differently within different disciplinary idioms. In her 
poetic chapter, Johns identifies the ‘possibility’ that Fitzpatrick locates 
within international law with the distinctive ‘rhythm’ of his scholarly 
engagements with it, and yet concludes that it is a possibility that will 
provide little reassurance to international lawyers.
 Johns approaches Fitzpatrick’s rhythm or method of reading and 
writing in terms of a critical practice, a way of living in or with interna-
tional law, rather than the production of knowledge about it. Yet she 
locates her reading of Fitzpatrick both within and outside of the discipline 
of international law. While his ‘insistence upon what he calls a “socio-
logic” ’ in international law can be related to ‘recurring attempts to restore 
to international law an imperative if paradoxical sociality’, Johns notes that 
Fitzpatrick’s call to imbue international law with ‘positive content’ may 
strike ‘the international lawyer on the street’ as risky, even retrogressive. 
More importantly, the critique may miss its mark, either because it is too 
easily accommodated within international law’s ‘comfortable, elastic cos-
mopolitanism’ or because it underestimates the utility of the pragmatic 
anti-formalism that is the critical international lawyer’s stock in trade. For 
an international lawyer, while the distinctive tempo of Fitzpatrick’s work 
can be understood in terms of a refreshing, if resolutely discordant, crit-
ical ethos in respect of much that is taken for granted within the field, it 
also defies the pragmatic impulse so deeply embedded in the psyche of 
the discipline: ‘nothing emerges that may be applied readily elsewhere’.
 Staying with international law, and bringing together the themes of 
reading slowly, creatively, and collaboratively is the similarly poetic 
account offered by Fiona Macmillan in Chapter 6 of the ‘tapestry’ of the 
intellectual endeavour in which she understands herself to be engaged. 
This effort, of weaving together (in both senses), understands scholarship 
as a (communal) process rather than an (individualized) product. Macmil-
lan is concerned with the ‘new constitutionalisms’ of both the national 
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Introduction  7
and the international, and the attempts to integrate and ‘harmonize’, at 
both levels, the economic and the political. Macmillan’s chapter draws on 
the first of Fitzpatrick’s lessons about reading modern law, and specifically 
the possibilities of critical redescription. Here that redescription is Fitz-
patrick’s reversal of the typical depiction of the international as being con-
stituted by the national, and his account of the mutually constitutive 
relationship between the national and the international which offers us 
new ways of reading domestic political processes as being shaped by the 
international. As Macmillan compellingly shows us, the effect of this in 
general, and of the international trading regime in particular, is that the 
political has become subordinated to the economic.
 Moving from the international to the universal, William Conklin in 
Chapter 7 engages with the question of law’s forms, and in particular the 
understanding of those forms as universals. Conklin’s chapter is a lovely 
illustration of what may be gained by a practice of reading slowly in con-
trast to more forensic styles of critique. Reading slowly has the potential to 
draw open a text, revealing the unexplored and unexamined possibilities 
that lie within it. Taking Fitzpatrick’s critique of analytical jurisprudence 
as his starting point, Conklin reminds us that another corollary of reading 
slowly is teaching slowly, and implied in slowness in that context is an 
approach to the question of knowledge that resonates with the decoloniza-
tion of law. Placing Fitzpatrick’s constant concern with the irresolution of 
law’s origins against the analytic tradition’s equally obsessive concern to 
pin it down, Conklin reminds us that
[a]n explanation of the origins of the legal order ‘a priori puts us 
outside’. The myth and mysticism of the origins remain a secret so 
long as contemporary legal theorists, law teachers, and other officials 
colour their analyses as the rule of law and objectivity. The secrecy is 
reinforced by disparaging rhetoric directed towards anyone, whether 
inside or outside the chains of analysed forms, who attempts to pierce 
the veil of the invisible foundation. Social bonding among the non-
expert knowers of legal forms [therefore] remains an outside 
possibility.
Through Fitzpatrick and Derrida, Conklin reminds us that the ‘painful 
consequence’ of this secrecy, and the asserted universality of forms, is viol-
ence and exclusion. Fitzpatrick has been especially concerned with this 
‘painful consequence of law with reference to the civilizing mission of the 
colonialist on the one hand and the indigenous experiences of the aborig-
inal peoples in North America and Australia on the other’. Following Fitz-
patrick into a concern with foundations, we understand that as ‘long as we 
remain in the illusion that the system (droit) of laws (lois) has a founda-
tion, we will pursue the colonizing project’. And yet Conklin shows us that 
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8  Reading Modern Law
a slow reading of Fitzpatrick and, with Fitzpatrick, of Derrida may also 
reveal a continuation of what Conklin calls a ‘territorial’ knowledge which 
presupposes that concepts are valid if they can be situated within familiar 
territorial and metaphysical boundaries. Territorial knowledge raises the 
prospect of power and violence as an inevitable feature of a modern state-
centric legal order and of the imperial and colonial condition of modern 
European and common law. And yet reading slowly shows us that Fitz-
patrick himself is haunted by the intuition that there might be another 
sense of knowledge. Conklin, like Macmillan, is concerned to ‘weave 
together’, treating scholarship as a communal practice rather than indi-
vidualized product. And he pushes Fitzpatrick’s own concern along, to 
outline a different sense: of ‘experiential’ knowledge. For Conklin, this 
radically different sense of knowledge is also nested in European legal 
thought, and opens a question as to whether even Fitzpatrick’s sophistic-
ated account of territorial knowledge tells the whole story about con-
temporary legal thought. Teasing these threads out from within 
Fitzpatrick’s texts enacts the lessons of slow reading Fitzpatrick’s own 
writing has taught us.
 The thought of the territorial and of the occupation of territory is taken 
up from within the tradition in another way. Like Conklin, Judith Grbich 
in Chapter 8 questions the inheritance of the form of law. She takes up 
the experience of the form of modern law and links it to Peter Fitz-
patrick’s work of ‘internal decolonization’. Drawing on the work of Ian 
Duncanson in delineating relations between law, modernity, gender, and 
race, Grbich draws out the sense in which Fitzpatrick’s project joins a long 
engagement with the experience and affective form of law: with Christian 
spirit and with the gendered and sexed understanding of the story of debt, 
economy, and authority. For Grbich this is a story read best in terms of 
Lutheran theology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Grbich asks, what is the 
character of the God which dwells as a colonizer within, and who or what 
aspect of ourselves has this God colonized? How else should this story be 
told except as biography, tradition, and law? How else can this be told 
except as the story of the Christianization, or at least the Lutheran Chris-
tianization, of the Law of Moses?
 In a sharp delineation of the Christian structure of modernity, Grbich 
links Martin Luther’s anti-Semitic characterization of the expropriation of 
labour and life by gluttony and drunkenness, the cost of clothing, and usu-
rious buying of rent charges with Freud’s story of the killing of God in 
Moses and Monotheism. Economy, and the exchange of economy, is struc-
tured around the desire of brothers for access to women. Authority, life, 
and exchange point both to the ways in which we kill God and to the ways 
in which we enter into cultural life and language. For Freud this was a 
story to be told in terms of a family romance. For Lacan it is one told in 
Aristotelian terms of the making of knowledge like ‘a procreation in which 
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Introduction  9
the masculine is the activating of a life’. Both accounts point to the ways in 
which ‘the sexed and theologically loaded fantasies embedded in the juris-
prudential archive have a central place in the ways the subject in moder-
nity is conceived’.
 Grbich draws Lacan’s accounts of authority and language into law by 
pointing to the ways in which Lacan reveals the continuities between 
Martin Luther’s onto-theological concerns with the discourses of trade, 
economy, and exchange, and contemporary forms of thinking. The New 
Testament and Lutheran teaching of ‘love thy neighbour as thyself’ trans-
form the meaning of the Eucharist from Catholic sacrifice to the sealing 
of a gift from God. However, as Grbich and Lacan note, in Luther’s telling 
of the New Testament this is a gift that turns out to be a debt – the gift of a 
financier and the sign of financial property. This gives us the dialectic of 
the Master and the Slave. It is these fantasies that put women into circula-
tion as the creation and property of men. While Luther’s interpretation of 
the Mass as a gift that overcomes the Mosaic law of prohibition gives us the 
entitlement of freedom (this is the gift of Christ), it also gives us the 
injunction to follow the life of Christ and give up life for the neighbour.
 Johan van der Walt in Chapter 9 too is concerned with reading the 
modern imaginary, returning us to the question of origins or grounds in 
his exploration of Fitzpatrick’s reading of Freud in Modernism and the 
Grounds of Law (2001). As is well known, Fitzpatrick turns to Freud in 
exploring the origins of human society, and the question of the grounds 
of law. In the quasi-ethnographic account of the primal horde in Freud’s 
Totem and Taboo, we find the origin myth that serves as an allegory of the 
origin of law. In what seems like a completely determined fixity, the father 
imposes order on the primal horde and has monopoly over the women. In 
the face of this order and fixity another sociality emerges: that of the sons 
who band together to kill and consume the father. The rupture ushers in 
a sense that possibility and newness can enter the world. But ‘taking leave’ 
of this order, as van der Walt puts it, does not offer ‘a stable abode’. The 
brothers find themselves
split by two seemingly irreconcilable concerns, the concern with a 
stability reminiscent to some degree of the fixity formerly imposed by 
the father, on the one hand, and a freedom to take leave of this order 
when the exigencies of desire and circumstance require this leave-
taking.
Driven by the need to reconcile this tension, the ‘totem’ is instituted. The 
killing of the totem is generally prohibited but occasionally allowed. This 
combines both order and the possibility of an occasional ecstatic overcom-
ing of that order. As Fitzpatrick (2001: 2–3) puts it, the ‘two extremities’ of 
determinate order and what is unknowably beyond are combined in the 
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10  Reading Modern Law
killing of the totem. The two extremities – determination and responsive-
ness – characterize totemic law. Van der Walt describes these dimensions 
or extremities of law ‘in terms of two homonyms that allow us to contem-
plate and trace further their wondrous and unmediated concentration and 
combination. The homonyms at issue here are immanence and imminence – 
where determination corresponds to immanence, and responsiveness to 
imminence. Following a discussion that distinguishes ‘immanence’ in the 
work of Deleuze and Guattari on the one hand, and Jean-Luc Nancy on 
the other, van der Walt suggests that the determinative aspect of law 
involves a claim that law is ‘immanent to itself’. An imminent or respon-
sive law, on the other hand, ‘is never fixed but always to come’.
 For van der Walt, a law that is immanent to itself fails to be hospitable 
or open to a law that is never fixed and always to come. In terms of the ori-
entation to slow reading which positions this volume, van der Walt’s 
chapter reminds us of another dimension of attentiveness – that of listen-
ing – that corresponds to the slowness in reading:
the misleading homonymic play between immanence and imminence 
can in fact lead us to hear imminence when we hear immanence and 
vice versa, or lead us to hear both simultaneously and leave us to first 
think and listen to what is to be heard before we can respond aptly.
Modern law advances the dominance of the determinate (immanent). Or, 
as Fitzpatrick puts it, ‘[t]he modern rule of law, with its avowal of assured 
stability and ultimacy of determination, seems closer to the condition of 
the primal horde’ (2001: 2). This is not to suggest that ‘utter responsive-
ness’ would be an alternative posture, as that would also return us to 
another totalized world. Immanence and imminence becomes danger-
ously fused – a condition that we experience in our mishearing and con-
fusing of the two terms. For van der Walt,
Between immanence and imminence is an infinitesimally small but 
always hugely impossible step, namely the step between the now and 
not-now, the step between time that is still for a moment and time that 
is always gone. The totem was devised to traverse this impossible step 
and embody this impossible threshold. And it is the consistent focus 
on this impossible step or threshold between the here and there and 
the now and then of law that renders Fitzpatrick’s work so relentlessly 
liminal.
This liminality of law takes the place of what would otherwise be an 
alchemy or reliance on a transcendental reference.
 But if Fitzpatrick’s work of reading – and the work of reading Fitzpatrick 
– reminds us of the intimacy between medium and message – and between 
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Introduction  11
the medium and its reading – the chapter by Carrol Clarkson (Chapter 
10) finds in Fitzpatrick a model of how responsiveness to law might be 
enacted. Writing from within the discipline of literary and aesthetic 
theory, Clarkson is oriented by an attention to the expressive and aesthetic 
forms taken up in response to the limits of law. In this, Clarkson (like 
Constable) attends to Fitzpatrick’s own citational practices. For Clarkson, 
this practice itself enacts, perhaps even constitutes, a relation between 
what is beyond law and what is interior to law. One task undertaken in 
Fitzpatrick’s Modernism and the Grounds of Law (2001), for example, is a 
form of responsiveness to the too literal grounding of law. For Clarkson, 
Fitzpatrick’s work is exemplary in the way it holds on to and elaborates the 
gesture of responding to the limits of law. Fitzpatrick writes in response to 
and against the enclosed space of Carl Schmitt’s European nomos, ‘whilst 
determination can never be completely spatially formed, responsiveness 
cannot be ever completely unformed’ (Fitzpatrick 2001: 91). Clarkson 
herself responds, with Heidegger, that what is important is not so much 
earth or world but the relation that is called forth or disclosed by art, or by 
law. The world of art is ‘responsive to the earthly forms in nature . . . it 
neither excludes them, nor does it abstract or reduce them to the 
supposedly determinate limits of its own world’. Rephrased in the 
language of limit, art and law do not simply exclude, they make possible. 
Fitzpatrick, argues Clarkson, identifies such a relation in terms of a 
response – a creative reaching out to a possibility beyond determinate 
existence – where law finds itself bound to its exterior. The limit or aporia 
that keeps law and justice apart also allows for the possibility of a relation 
– of a justice, law, or ground yet to come.
 Reading, relationality, and limit are themes that take us full circle, 
(back) to Abdul Paliwala’s evocative chapter (Chapter 11), which provides 
us with a fireside resting place before Fitzpatrick’s own contribution to this 
volume. In what is the most avowedly biographical chapter in the book, 
Paliwala takes us back to Fitzpatrick’s early engagements with law and pol-
itics in Papua New Guinea, hinting at the ways in which Fitzpatrick’s 
‘reflexive transgressive form of participatory engagement with people who 
were being subordinated’ has shaped his practices of reading and writing, 
and living with, law ever since. Paliwala uses the metaphor of reading and 
writing by firelight to consider the particular demands and possibilities – 
and limitations – of decolonizing law. ‘Firelight’, he observes, ‘is both 
warmly seductive and in its flickering quality not a great medium for 
readers or writers’, and yet the particular ethical commitments it evinces 
are well captured by the implicit contrast to the electric glare of modern 
law. This contrast becomes contradiction in the form of Fitzpatrick as a 
‘carrier’ of modern law in Papua New Guinea, but a carrier as jurist, as 
reader, who speaks not as a jurist ‘of the South’3 but as a critical reader of 
his own traditions. Thus emplaced, Fitzpatrick, according to Paliwala, tried 
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12  Reading Modern Law
always to enact the resistant and transgressive possibilities of the law in a 
society putatively ‘in rapid transition’ from tradition to modernity, from 
colony to post-colony, while always also aware of the inescapable tension 
between the imperial and counter-imperial dimensions of law. In his sub-
sequent practice, Fitzpatrick has held on to something of that emplace-
ment, reading and writing against the grain, and teaching us to read and 
write in a similar vein, of critique and care, for both law and its ‘critical 
beings’ (Fitzpatrick and Tuitt 2004).
 Fitzpatrick’s own contribution concludes this volume, bringing together 
modern law’s mythopoetic quality with its characteristic duality of 
determinacy and responsiveness, combined and made visible through the 
practice of reading – and writing – slowly. Here Fitzpatrick suggests that 
law and literature share a creative and fictive quality. But saying what this 
fictive quality may be is no easy matter. Almost all the contributors to this 
volume have pointed to Fitzpatrick’s characterization of law as combining 
a determinate and responsive quality. In Chapter 12 he extends this to the 
‘receptive creativity’ that both law and literature share. But he also insists 
on the persistence and insistence of the negative – the sense that ‘poetry 
makes nothing happen’ (Auden 1979). But as Fitzpatrick makes clear, with 
a citational practice we have drawn attention to, what happens is far from 
‘nothing’:
What Auden means with ‘poetry makes nothing happen’ is that it 
brings nothingness into happening. In the same poem he describes 
poetry as ‘[a] way of happening, a mouth’ (1979: 82). Or as Blanchot 
puts it even more expansively: ‘Nothingness is the creator of the world 
in man’ (1999: 398–9). Or we have nothing as our ‘flowering’ in 
Celan’s ‘Psalm’ (2002: 153). (The evocation of nothing can make the 
academic feel the need of copious reference.)
An attentiveness to the event of newness or happening is a consistent 
theme in Fitzpatrick’s work. After Nietzsche, he urges us to read and write 
slowly – partly as a way of countering this ‘age of work’, but also in order 
to leave some doors open. This is the injunction with which we began, ‘to 
read slowly, deeply, looking cautiously before and aft, with reservations, 
with doors left open, with delicate eyes and fingers’ (Nietzsche 1982: 5; 
and see Goodrich 2005: 189–97).
 As a volume, Reading Modern Law gathers together a collection of essays 
that pay close attention to a critical approach to sovereign formations and 
the grounds of law. The character of modern law is approached through 
an emphasis on the rhetorical and discursive practices which we regard as 
constitutive of what law is. As we have suggested, we approach the task of 
studying law by privileging an attitude to reading texts. This is not espe-
cially new. There are several excellent studies that have examined the 
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Introduction  13
nature and character of law from a critical and interdisciplinary perspec-
tive which emphasizes the ethical importance of reading (slowly), and we 
take our bearings from Goodrich (1986), Fitzpatrick (1992, 2001), Consta-
ble (2005), Douzinas and Geary (2008), and Pavlich (2010).
 But if an attention to reading – and slow reading in particular – is not 
new, the study of the ‘grounds’ of law – understood broadly as authorization, 
foundation, arche, and memory of legal decisions and institutions – owes 
much to Peter Fitzpatrick, the leading theorist of modern law’s grounding 
and groundlessness. From his early, path-breaking work on myth and moder-
nity which characterized the irresolution of modern law’s expulsion of 
mythic structures and narratives (Fitzpatrick 1992) to his later work directly 
on the grounds of law, what emerges crucially is the ambivalence at the core 
of what characterizes law and the legal decision – an irresolute combination 
of law’s determinate and responsive qualities (Fitzpatrick 2001).
 Following Fitzpatrick, we learn that treating a combination of the deter-
minant and responsive qualities – of law, and of sovereignty – as the object 
of study can serve to reveal the dynamism and potential in a law that is too 
often regarded as radically over-determined, whether by something called 
the ‘social’, or by the sovereign exception. And so the fact that scholars 
and critics disagree about how to define sovereignty is less our concern 
here than the idea that different ways of reading sovereign formations 
suggest different engagements between writer, reader, and sovereign, as 
well as with justice and law.
 Accordingly, many of the chapters of this volume can also be seen as 
taking a sideways glance at sovereignty, thinking about sovereignty ‘slant-
wise’ through cognate concepts such as democracy, governance, interna-
tional law, constitutionalism, theology, imperialism, the force of literature, 
psyche, and sacrifice, each addressed here to a greater or lesser extent as 
sovereign formations. And although we are far from suggesting that the 
multiple, situated, and persistent sovereign disasters can be reduced to a 
text, or resisted by strategies of reading alone, we take inspiration from 
Fitzpatrick to think about what practices of re-reading both legal texts and 
sovereign events with slowness, or a kind of ‘radical care’, might offer.
 But if the irresolution between determinacy and responsiveness, and 
the practices of reading that it engenders, demands, and sustains, can 
help us to live with modern law, the legality to be encountered through 
Fitzpatrick’s work is a ‘terminal’ one (Fitzpatrick 2001: 100, 148, 175, 
184). It is terminal not only because modern law has been a reliable com-
panion of imperial death-dealing and colonial appropriations of various 
kinds; it is terminal, too, not in the sense of finality, but in the sense that 
it makes something possible – beyond. Terminus is the Roman god of 
boundaries; his temple is open to the sky. Holding open a place between 
forms of dissolution – the work of irresolution – is one of the tasks of the 
reader of law.
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14  Reading Modern Law
Notes
1 See Emily Dickinson, ‘Tell all the Truth but tell it slant’ (1960: 506 [1128]).
2 On slowness and law’s time, see the lovely essay by Karin van Marle (2003).
3 See generally Black et al. (2007).
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